This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This collection contains twenty-three papers published by Suppes over the last eighteen years. For the most part they are foundational studies ranging over a wide variety of topics in the philosophy of science. The first two of four parts contain papers on methodological issues like models, measurement, probability and utility. There are two papers on models, an axiomatic treatment of extensive quantity and two papers on measurement. The six papers in Part II deal with probability theory and decision theory with (...) reference to theories of behavior, economics, and other topics. Part III contains studies in the axiomatic foundations of physics, one on relativistic kinematics and three on probability in quantum mechanics. The final and longest section contains eight papers on the foundations of psychology. Several of these deal with the psychological or behavioral bases of mathematics. Others deal with unpredictability in human behavior, finite automata, cognition and other topics. The book is nicely printed and those who have learned from Suppes work in the past will be grateful for this collection of his most important papers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author is a Czech physiologist who has given many years of experimental study to the temporal sense in man. He reviews the psychological literature on the sense of time, then describes his own experiments and the theory which he thinks explains them. He believes there are biological rhythms which determine our physiological sense of time and in particular that the alpha rhythm of the brain provides the fundamental reference rhythm by which the organism measures time. This rhythm is autonomous, (...) unchanging in the course of time, present when not evident externally and thus very suitable for time measurement. Experimental evidence for this view reported in the book concerns laborious studies of temporally conditioned reflexes in man carried out by the author over a number of years. He hedges his conclusions and concedes that there is much more work to be done, but his work is both interesting and important. There is little philosophizing in the book, but there is much of philosophical importance.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The problem of perception is one of specifying correct and consistent meanings for the concepts we use in talking about it. The most frequent mistake in the history of this concept has been to "reduce" perception either to sensation or to judgment. With this in mind, the author deals primarily with the period from Descartes to Kant, though ancient, medieval, and contemporary developments are also treated.--R. H. K.

The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this work R. M. Martin carries his semiotical studies into the fields of intensional semantics and pragmatics, dealing with such philosophically important concepts as meaning, preference, reasonableness and indifference. The crucial notion is that of the meaning or intension of an expression. Two major categories are distinguished, objective intensions and subjective intensions. To deal with objective intensions an intensional semantics is developed as an extension of denotational semantics in the tradition of Tarski, Carnap and Martin's earlier Truth and Denotation. (...) In the treatment of subjective intensions Martin makes an advance over his earlier study of pragmatics by utilizing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.—R. H. K. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to some new areas of contemporary logic which generally fall under the rubric of philosophical logic. It succeeds in this task to a degree, although the chapters are for the most part adaptations of journal articles published by Rescher over the last ten years and are more self-contained than they might have been. But the book should renew interest in the problems of philosophical logic. It contains many interesting discussions and (...) a great deal of useful information. Rescher begins with chapters on modal logic which include some discussion of intuitionistic logic and the causal modalities as well as the alethic modalities. He then discusses the notion of belief as a representative notion of epistemic logic. A long chapter is devoted to a history and survey of the main systems of many valued logics. Shorter, but still substantial, chapters are devoted to the logic of existence, non-standard quantification theory, chronological or tense logic, topological or positional logic, logic of assertion and logic of preference. Still shorter chapters are given to deontic logic, probability logic, a discussion of random individuals and self-reference. An interesting final chapter provides a new "discourse on method" for the philosophical or applied logician.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The essays in philosophical logic collected in this volume are dedicated to Henry S. Leonard who was one of the first American philosophers to urge the application of modern logic to non-mathematical areas. Leonard also inspired the development of certain areas of contemporary philosophical logic discussed in some of the papers of this volume. This is especially clear in the case of free, or presupposition free, logics which Leonard's early work on a logic of existence inspired. In one essay of (...) this volume Bas C. Van Frassen further develops his work on the semantics of free logic. In another, Milton Fisk relates free logic to modal logic, suggesting a new semantics of strength to deal with various problems in the area and in a third essay, Karel Lambert relates free logic to certain logical puzzles about quantum theory. Leonard was also one of the first to entertain the idea of and discuss a logic of questions and an erotetic logic or logic of interests. The volume contains essays on these topics by Nuel D. Belnap and David Harrah. Leonard's interest in modal logic is reflected in Fisk's article as well as in an article by Richmond Thomason on modal logic and metaphysics. His interest in epistemic logic is seen in an essay on the logic of belief by Jon Vickers and an essay by Hintikka applying the logic of belief and knowledge to problems about the ontological argument. In addition to these essays, there are five others of high quality on diverse topics: R. M. Martin on intentions, Wilfrid Sellars on the metaphysics of the person, R. M. Chisholm on agency, Frederick Fitch on combinatory logic and negative numbers, and H. E. Hendry and G. J. Massey on Sheffer functions. This is a worthy memorial to a quietly influential American philosopher.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is a study of meaning and meaninglessness which takes as its point of departure a discussion of sentences like "The theory of relativity is blue" which some philosophers call category mistakes and which this author calls type crossings. His answer to the question of the basis of the meaninglessness of such sentences differs from most currently fashionable ones. For example, he argues in separate chapters against the view that the basis for the meaninglessness of sentences involving type crossings (...) is in the fact that they are ungrammatical. He also rejects the view that this basis is in the fact that the sentences violate certain rules of language His answer is that type crossings are meaningless because they designate unthinkable propositions. He then devotes two long and crucial chapters to an attempt to elaborate on the notion of unthinkability. His approach is more complicated than this brief summary would suggest for he distinguishes between accidental and essential properties and relations, requiring different criteria for type crossings involving accidental or essential attributes. Drange's views run against the grain of much contemporary philosophizing about meaning, e.g., his essentialism, his advocacy of a kind of synthetic a priori and his emphasis on thinkability over rules of language. But he comes to these positions by exposing what he takes to be difficulties in alternative views, so that his views are always challenging. Aside from its main theses, the book looks into topics about meaning and type crossings which other writers have scarcely noticed or discussed. For example, he tries to come to grips with the largely uncharted region of type crossings involving relational properties and those involving types other than types of things.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A critical treatment of four basic methodological principles of science: simplicity, micro-reduction, verification, and connectivity. In each case, the major question is whether, and on what grounds, the principle can be justified. This quest for justification should be of particular interest to those concerned with the philosophy of science from the standpoint of epistemology and metaphysics.--R. H. K.

This is a collection of essays written by Hintikka over a period of eight or nine years on logics of existence and on the semantics of modal logics, areas in which he has made pioneer studies. The introductory essay defends formal methods in philosophical analysis. Two essays follow on logics of existence, one of them relating such logics to discussions of the ontological argument. Of the four essays on the semantics of modal logics, the first two "Modality and Quantification" and (...) "The Modes of Modality" discuss the possibilities for philosophical work with the semantics of modal logics generally and the second two "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes" and "Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions" discuss philosophical applications and try to deal with some of Quine's objections to modal logics. Two final essays apply Hintikka's methods to problems in the philosophy of perception and metaethics. In a paper "On the Logic of Perception" he discusses the nature of immediate perception and sense-data theories and in a paper "Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals" he discusses the distinction between prima facie and absolute obligation and John Searle's attempted derivation of "ought" from "is." All essays but this last one have been previously published, but not all in places readily available to English-speaking readers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In the introduction to this bibliography of works in the philosophy of science, the author stresses that it provides only the éléments of a bibliography and does not claim to be complete. His aim is to provide a starting point around which interested parties can build their own bibliographies. Although it may be of some use in this regard, philosophers of science in the English-speaking world will not find the volume of very much use for authors writing in English. Some (...) authors are not listed at all and others who do appear have only two or three listings. Examples could be multiplied, but these provide a representative picture of the volume's limitations in this regard. On the other hand, as a preliminary guide to books and articles in the philosophy of science by authors writing in different languages than one's own, the book can be of undoubted usefulness. Works in most of the languages of Western Europe are listed, the majority in French, German and Italian, as well as English.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author offers some interesting suggestions for the rewriting of the history of logic which modern developments in symbolic logic demand. He divides the history into two parts, the first dealing with what is called the Aristotelian core of logic and the improvements made on that core within a basically classical tradition, and the second, with the tradition of improvements inspired by Leibniz' idea of mathematical logic. The book is brief and much less of a comprehensive history than a prolegomena.--R. (...) H. K. (shrink)

In an introductory sketch of history of scholastic interest in aesthetics, the author notes the reawakening of Thomistic interest in this subject since the last century. He adds, with evidence drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century works, that this interest has been accompanied by methodological confusions and a misunderstanding of the theory of beauty of St. Thomas himself. He seeks to remedy this situation with a scholarly treatment of Aquinas' theory of beauty, divided into two parts; the first a genetic (...) investigation of the development of Thomas's ideas on beauty, the second a systematic account of the mature theory. A notable attempt to develop Aquinas' ideas on this subject from the entire corpus of his writings and not merely from the Summas and one or two other major works.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a translation of Jacob Klein's study "Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra" which appeared in 1934-1936. His principal thesis is that the Renaissance mathematicians of the sixteenth century did not simply continue the work of the Greek and Arab mathematicians but in the process of developing ancient mathematics introduced a radically new conception of number which has since guided modern mathematical thought. The central figure in this revolution is Vieta. Klein traces the influence of Vieta's ideas (...) upon Stevin, Descartes, Wallis, and other figures of the scientific revolution, after discussing the conception of number and arithmetic in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek sources. Persons reading this book with a primary interest in the philosophical ideas involved will be frustrated by the mass of historical detail which often obscures rather than illuminates the philosophical issues. But the book deserves its reputation as an important historical study.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this book the author develops his own systems of and semantics for presupposition free logic. He calls his systems logics without existence assumptions, by which he means logical systems which are sound and complete with respect to a semantic theory in which a universe of discourse can be empty but any term which denotes must denote something in the universe, all predicates including identity represent relations holding among members of the universe and the quantifiers range over just all the (...) members of the universe. In a brief introductory chapter the author reviews the motivations for constructing non-standard logics of this kind and briefly discusses what he takes to be the limitations of previous work done in the field. Persons interested in the philosophical problems and uses of such logics are likely to find this chapter interesting though disappointingly brief. Four of the eight chapters are devoted to the development of a natural deduction system N which is a logic without existence assumptions in the author's sense. The system N is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the author's semantics. An axiomatic system L is later developed and shown to be equivalent to N. The final chapter is devoted to discussing the relation of his work to many-valued logics, modal logics, intuitionistic logic and the theory of classes among other topics. The author believes that logics without existence assumptions "will in the long run displace the less natural and more narrow standard logics."--R. H. K. (shrink)